While the reopening of the Red Sea appears to be a White House priority, the new global US maritime policy continues to emerge. At the same time, the aggressive US strategy of additional tariffs has been confirmed. All these parameters could weigh heavily on supply and demand.
Let’s look back together at this busy month of March that started with a bang with the 2025 TPM in Long Beach, an annual trade show bringing together the elite of the international container sector (4,200 participants from 42 countries). This new US policy has obviously been a major talking point in the discussions.
Containerised shipping companies generally reported excellent financial results for 2024, significantly above initial forecasts. By causing an increase in freight rates, the crisis in the Red Sea clearly saved the year.
2025 has started under more difficult conditions, as operations via the Cape of Good Hope have now become the norm. Symptom of this new situation: MSC temporarily pulled its mega container ships out of the Asia-Northern Europe trade to support freight rates, hoping to be followed by other maritime alliances. The Italo-Swiss shipping line has shifted this cumbersome fleet to the Mediterranean.
At this beginning of the year, shipping companies have been regularly asked about a possible re-establishment of the passage of ships through the Suez Canal, and all are very reserved. After Maersk and MSC, Hapag-Lloyd also announced through its CEO Rolf Habben Jansen that such a return would in any case be made only in a very progressive way.
The subject seems to be returning to the top of the priorities of the new US administration. In March, the US stepped up strikes against Yemen’s Houthi rebels.
The United States Trade Representative, (USTR) proposed a series of financial taxation measures targeting Chinese ships stopping off at US ports, but also shipping companies operating Chinese ships and Chinese operators. This announcement, which came just days before the start of Long Beach’s TPM25, of course largely fuelled conversations. “Surtaxes on stopovers at U.S. ports would have the effect of concentrating activity on larger ports and driving up inflation on retail prices, as these charges would be passed on to the merchandise,” warned MSC CEO Soren Toft. Additionally, such a scenario presents a proven risk of port congestion in major Chinese ports, Singapore as well as Los Angeles and Long Beach. Europe should not suffer the same consequences.
The U.S. Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) has announced the launch of an investigation into seven critical areas for global shipping, with the aim of identifying “regulations, policies, or practices that create unfavorable shipping conditions.” The seven “chokepoints” examined are the Northern Sea Passage, the English Channel, the Malacca Strait, the Singapore Strait, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Panama Canal, and the Suez Canal. If we find on this list the well-known hot spots, the inclusion of the English Channel suggests commercial objectives in addition to security objectives.
In February, Panamanian President José Raul Mulino officially announced his country’s withdrawal from the Silk Roads project, an announcement that China quite expectedly reacted negatively to. This Panama issue, which had been highlighted by President Trump as soon as he was inaugurated, experienced a new chapter in March: The Hong Kong group Hutchison Ports entered into exclusive negotiations with a consortium formed by the US investment fund Black Rock and Terminal Investment Limited (TiL), a subsidiary of the MSC group, for the sale of almost all its ports. Included in the shopping basket are the port terminals of Balboa and Cristobal, at each end of the Panama Canal. President Trump immediately hailed the deal as the beginning of the canal’s reconquest. But the forced sale of Hutchison’s strategic assets proved to a pill too bitter to swallow in Beijing. While the signature of the transaction had been announced for early April, it was finally adjourned.
In such a context, it is necessary to be bold to sign contracts providing for fixed freight rates for one year, even if it is now accepted that in the event of a massive return via the Red Sea in 2025, contracts without a review clause will not last for very long without being reviewed (...)